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ASCETICISM AND THE VALUE OF TRUTH IN
THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS

Julie Anne Buchsbaum
Beloit College
From the outset of The Genealogy ofMorals, Nietzsche calls for a
sweeping critique of traditional morality. Lamenting the absence of
other such attempts, he undertakes an investigation into the specific
conditions which have historically genera ted moral values and, most
importantly, re-estimates the worth of these values whose goodness
has hitherto been assumed to be impervious to doubt. Asceticism is
the most sigruficant ethical ideal Nietzsche narrows in on in The
Genealoglj ofMorals, and he devotes an entire section to its analysis;
indeed, he has good reason to do so since, for Nietzsche, the element
of self-overcoming is the backbone of all moral codes (Kaufmann, p.
211-3). Suspecting a pathological perversion of the will and the
origin of bad conscience in the Christian treatment of asceticism,
Nietzsche traces the manifestations of this ideal and how it has
devolved under the sway of institutionalized religion; furthermore,
he exposes its interrelation with the will to truth and power, and
questions its overall contribution to human existence. In this paper,
I examine Nietzsche's genealogical inquiry into asceticism in order
to determine whether he rejects this nation as irretdevably tainted
through its monopolization by the Christian-moral intel'pretation.
Asceticism may nat be inherently good, but is it necessarily and
essentially decadent, anti-body and life-negating? I shall argue that
Nietzsche does not abandon the ascetic practise and tha t a Nie tzschean
re-valuation of the term can promote an opposing form of asceticism
which departs from the traditional debilitation of the body and an
authoritative position of centered meaning.
In The Genealoglj ofMora Is , Nietzsche declares that ethics are bam
of blood, cruelty and torture. His analysiS ofWesternetliics takes us
as far back as the very geneSis of religious practises, which he
perceives to have been founded on a debtor-creditor relation be
tween ancient ancestors and their descendents (GM, p. 222). AscetiBuchsbaum is asenior at Beloit College. A philosophy and classics double II/ajar, she lives ill
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Her paper is tlte result of a semester-long independent study of
Nietzsc/te'S philosophy.
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dsmhas its origin in the development ofthls relationship. First of all,
pain, according to Nietzsche, was of instrumental value in forging a
conscience out of the brute instinctiveness of an uncultivated race of
humans. Noble rulers carved the awareness of debt and duty into the
minds of others through torture and the sacrifice of those who
transgressed this code of obligation. In addition, pain often consti
tuted. in archaic civilizations, the repayment of a debt. Nietzsche
asserts that the creditor was entitled to indulge his lust for power
with complete license over an insolvent debtor, who offered up his
humiliation and pain to the delight of his tormentor. The debt was
thereby erased by the psychological "pleasure of rape" (GM, p. 196).
However appalling these revelations may seem to us, it soon
becomes clear that Nietzsche is not unearthing the nature of this
sadistic contractual arrangement in order to demonstrate how far
modern society has come subsequently in repudiating such barbar
ity. On the contrary, Nietzsche claims that cruelty pervades and
underlies all higher culture-the instinct to punish has not disap
peared but only been driven inward; consequently, people are now
ashamed to experience these urges which, bottled up inside, poison
the once healthy human being with concepts of sin and self-accusa
tion. Here then, is the inception of the hypocritical bad conscience
which Nietzsche never tires of railing against; what had formerly
been experienced with" the naive j oy and innocence of the animal" is
now spurned and denaturalized (GM, p. 199). The process which
divorces the individual from his or her instinct to domina te inspires
the repudiation of the whole realm of bodily functions and a general
aversion to life, since life is grounded in these drives and functions.
This radical inversion of the value of the instincts engendered the
ascetic ideal. In one of his numerous foreshadowings of Freud,
Nietzsche declares that "[a]11 instincts that are not allowed free play
turn inward" (GM, p. 217); thus, under historical conditions which
prohibited the external venting of hostility, humans thwarted and
internalized violent urges and ascetic priests ruthlessly terrorized
this new "enemy"-their own impulses. Nietzsche deplores this
form of asceticism as being an ancillary principle of Christian anti
sensual metaphysiCS. This practise encourages us to dichotomize
spirit and body, privileging the spirit as pure, active, good and
deriding the body as the source of all impurity, passivity and evil.
Any moral doctrine, such as that of St. Paul, which sees only the
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darker aspects of the passions and thus extols their annihilation,
provides fodder for some of Nietzsche's most caustic polemics
against Christian asceticism (GS, p.189). Nietzsche rejects the ascetic
ideal as it is informed by the Christian bifurcation of human nature
on the grounds that it institutes an impossibly distorted idealization
that can never be realized; he asserts further that its sole purpose is
to assure humans of their irremediably flawed natures and to rein
force a blind hatred of life. Humankind's sense of indebtedness to
God (the most ancient ancestor) is then carried to unprecedented
extremes. As Nietzsche writes, with characteristic hyperbolic flam
boyance, Christianized man
stretched himself upon the contradiction 'God' and
'Devil' as onarack. He projected all his denials of self.
nature, naturalness out of himself as affirmations, as
true being, embodiment, reality, as God ... as endless
torture, as hell, as the infinitude of guilt and punish
ment. In such psychological cruelty we see an insan
ity of the will that is without parallel ... [the] will to
poison the very foundation of things (GM, p. 226).
Furthermore, this insane will to power which lies at the heart of the
ascetic ideal is disguised by adherents of Christianity; Christian sects
deny that the motivating source of asceticism is an internalized
impulse to persecute others because this impulse is branded as
immoral by the devotees of slave morality. Thus, the ascetic ideal is
shroudedin a moralhalowhichprevents it frombeingproblematized
or re-interpreted.
Following Nietzsche's analysiS in The Genealogy ofMorals, there
is a second way in which the will to power is expressed through the
ascetic i.deal At the beginning of the third essay, Nietzsche claims
that the manifold deployment of this ideal suggests a deeper ten
dency of human nature at work-the desire to stave off a void at all
costs. He states that "[o]ur will requires an aim; it would sooner have
the void for its purpose than be void of purpose" (GM, p. 231). The
ascetic ideal is seen to be intimately bound to notions of truth and the
whole project of intellectual inquiry, even if the intellectual disavows
the more explicit form of sensual asceticism. The ascetic ideal, then,
also permeates the will to truth, which in tum actuates philosophical
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interrogation. The intellectual mode of asceticism veils the constant
sense of a chaotic meaninglessness which lies beneath the seemingly
airtight categories of truth, identity and unity-the chaos that threat
ens to explode the apparently substantive nature of these notions.
Nietzsche maintains, somewhat paradoxically, that even those
academics who consider themselves atheists and anti-ascetics are, in
fact, the unwitting vehicles of the ascetic ideal in its most purified
form. He writes, "the intellectual stoicism which in the end re
nounces denial quite as strictly as it does affirmation ... spell[s]
asceticism every bit as much as does the renunciation of sensuality"
(GM. pp. 287-8). In other words, the philosopher or scholar may
disengage him or herself from metaphYSical debates in the realiza
tion that traditional categories of meaning fail to accommodate the
world of becoming; nonetheless, this philosophical restraint is in
spired by precisely the same force (the will to truth) as is the belief in
substance and unity. The scholar who prudently withholds judge
ment in the face of the now-recognized enigmatic nature of existence
still, at bottom, retains the beliefin the diametrical opposition of truth
and falsehood, and esteeming the truth ab ove all else, is driven by the
desire to avoid error. The relentless will to comprehend the essence
of reality yields, at last, the notion that there is no such essence to be
comprehended; thus, the Christian exaltation of "tw.th" turns back
upon itself and destroys its own ethic (GM, p. 297). The will to truth,
then, is another form of the ascetic ideal, and this will mitigates our
fear of the void by positing attainable truth as its aim, even when this
truth is non-truth or absence of truth-even when we have banished
the dogmatic trappings of substance philosophy.
Intellectual asceticism is related to priestly asceticism in its
determination to impose meaning on human existence. While the
ascetic priest tries to eradicate the passions which chain him to the
temporal world, this very attempt fortifies those chains byproviding
a meaning and direction for his life as well as the life of his commu
nity. From his violent denunciations of the earth spring a reason for
the continuation of life, much as the scholar's sl.lspension of judg
ment in the hopes of attaining truth in non-truth perpetuates his or
her lust for truth. In a sense, then, both forms of asceticism serve an
instinct for self-preservation. Although the ascetic ideal intensifies
suffering and propagates illusions, in doing so it makes existence
tolerable because it interprets suffering and masks those illusions as
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truths. Thus, the willing of unconditional truth (as a means of
sustaining life) seems to be a process Nietzsche might approve of,
since he would be the last to counsel a suicidal resignation to despair.
However, on the very last page of The Genealogy of Morals,
Nietzsche cuts the bottom out of any reading of the ascetic ideal
which renders it ultimately life-affirming. He writes,
this whole process ofwilling ... this hatred of human
ity, of animality, of inert matter; this loathing of the
senses ... this longing to escape from illusion. change.
becoming. death, and from longing itself ... signifies ...
a will to nothingness, a revulsion from life, a rebellion
against the principle conditions of living (GM,p. 299).
Although Nietzsche's genealogical path now seems highly inconsis
tent (first, the ascetic ideal was seen as the source of bad conscience,
then as an expedient survival-mechanism and finally, as a reaction
against life), Nietzsche, in the end, is indicating what lies beneath the
will to truth and the ascetic ideal; after all, Nietzsche never asserts
that life itself is the ultimate goal of the human spirit. Indeed, while
asceticism may have the immediate result of warding off suicide by
"spreading over existence the blandishments of illusion" (BT, p. 108),
if completely realized, its final culmination is death, its deepest
motive is the annihilation of all existence. Being a principle which
rigidly excludes other interpretive systems, the ideal reveals itself as
being the most extreme expression of the will to power. If error is a
necessary condition of life (and Nietzsche believes it is). then the
search for absolute truths, truths untouched by change, sin or human
failing. must be prompted by a more fundamental drive than that of
self-preservation-it must arise from the desire for power. To want
to gaze on the bare Medusa-face of in-itself reality, to unveil the
naked Urstoffe of the cosmos is to desire petrifaction~ it is to desire the
impossible-the shedding of one's own particular, finite, subjective
point of view and the mind-body aggregate tha t makes thought and
curiosity possible. To want to tear ourselves out of the web of
becoming to get a glimpse at what lies "beneath" or "behind" its
oscillating illusions is to desire that utmost power and the end of all
becoming-death. Therefore, Nietzsche successfully fleshes out the
claim which launches the third essay; the claim that the will would
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sooner have death (the void) as its aim and purpose than lack a
purpose.
Thus, at the end of The Genealogy ofMorals, are we left to assume
that. thanks to Nietzsche, asceticism has been once and for all
debunked, devalued, exposed as aninclination one would do well to
avoid? Are we justified then in abandoning ourselves to hedonistic
dissipation and forgetting about philosophy? Not unless Nietzsche
has undergone a complete apostasy, for his works abound in pas~
sages in which he reviles the whole notion of eudaemonistic laisser
alles. Repeatedly he heaps derision upon those who would escape
from suffering, bury their heads in the sands of ignorance and
acquiesce to a lukewarm, "go-with-the-flow" mentality. Letting
oneself go and submitting indiscriminately to every whim certainly
does not pave the way to greatness for Nietzsche. Nothing worth~
while at any level of culture has ever been attained without the
expense of ruthless sacrifice.
Furthermore, the will to truth as expressed through the ascetic
ideal is also not entirely discarded. Again, throughout Nietzsche's
works he makes it clear that he holds the uncompromising search for
truth and "the desire for certainh} ... [to be] that which separates the
higher humanbeings from the lower" (GS, p. 76). Indeed, if Nietzsche
had decided to dispense with reason and with the metaphysical
categories of value that are inevitably congealed in. philosophical
discourse, he would have ceased writing after his critique of asceti~
cism. That is patently not the case. Though I believe Kaufmann
overestimates Nietzsche's regard for rationality. plenty of textual
evidence bears out his claim that Nietzsche "proposed to measure
power and weakness in terms of man's willingness to subject even
his most cherished beliefs to the rigors of rationality" (Kaufmann, p.
232). I believe Nietzsche values lOgiC, consistency and reason, but is
also equally aware of their limitations and is unwilling to assign
them a superior status in philosophical inquiry. The irrationality
Nietzsche objects to is revealed in the will to unconditional truth
which automatically rejects deception, inconsistency and instinct
and endorses rational consciousness ("their weakest, most fallible
organ") as the only key to truth (GM, p. 217).
How, then, might one envision a Nietzsche an reappropriation of
asceticism that does not fall prey to the Christian-metaphysical
interpretation? Is it possible that in Nietzsche's writings ideas that
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take themselves too seriously by denying the absence of transcen
dental grounding "are themselves released from the ideologies and
passions that have held them and now lead to thoughts and passions
that depart from and contradict the earlier. authoritative structures,"
as Scott asks (GM, p. 211)? First of all, one simply needs to refer back
to The Genealogy of Morals to discover how Nietzsche re-interprets
asceticism for the philosopher who affirms existence. Simply put,
"[a]sceticismprovides him with the condition most favorable to the
exercise of his intelligence" (GM, p. 243). Shed of its self-important
piety, the notion of asceticism for the philosopher is severed from
concepts of moral scruple. The philosopher who is driven to create
from an over-abundance of strength does not tame his or her desires
out of a hatred for the bodybut rather because his or her passions are
completely channelled into the creative process and thus spiritual
izedinto a higher level of humanexpression. According to Nietzsche,
only the weak would be so afraid of their impulses that they would
seek to eliminate them entirely. Indeed, if anything, the philosopher
does not wish to destroy the senses and paSSions but rather to
sharpen and deepen them in order to intensify the power of the
philosophical project.
The priestly form of asceticism, in contrast, aims at the extirpa
tion of the impulses because it is driven by a hatred of fles.h and
resentment toward life. The ascetic priest ultimately wIshes to inflict
suffering. in the form of guilt, upon those who witness his self
mutilation. and to reinforce the community's adoration of him. The
affirmative philosopher, on the other hand. views his or her self
restraint simply as a necessary condition of unrelenting devotion to
creativity. The philosopher is indifferent to society's assessment of
him or her; the distress of others which may result from this indiffer
ence is an inadvertent side-effect, not the primary goal. Thus, philo
sophical asceticism is stripped of its romantic ostentation and the
self-aggrandizing righteousness that pollutes theChristianizedform.
Secondly, in seeking a counter-ideal to Christian asceticism, one
might consider Nietzsche's brief comments about art in The Geneal
oglJ OfMora Is. Here he makes it clear that the artistic endeavor at least
approximates an adverse ideal: "As for art ... it is far more radically
opposed to the ascetic ideal than is science. In art the lie becomes
consecrated, the will to deception has good conscience at its back"
(GM,p. 290). Although Nietzsche rejects the artist as too malleable to
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defend this counter-ideal. this brief passage offers at least a sugges
tion of what Nietzsche might have been directing us toward. The
artist aims at deception in that he or she depicts the surface. the
plastic. the superficial. and lives at the level of externality by employ
ing images that appeal to the senses rather than trying to plumb the
depths of reality and ensnare the object of inquiry with a cold,
conceptual net. Whereas the metaphysician wants to maintain that
his or her theoretical matrix corresponds directly to in-itself reality,
the artist entertains no such notions-the artistis aware thatthe mask
is a mask-and thus has a clear conscience when manipulating
constructed images. In a sense, then, Nietzsche's own writing is an
artistic act in that it refers not to an extralinguistic source of validity
but is authorized performatively and with the reflection of its own
genealogical configuration. Nietzsche's interrogation of established
ideals can be construed as an artistic exercise in the sense that he
analyzes different ways in which a term is masked throughout its
historical transmutations and at particular historical junctions
indeed at the very start of the inquiry he announces his intention to
explore the historical conditions which give rise to moral values
rather than to probe into the supposed underlying essence of these
values. Nietzsche does not succumb to the illusion that his analysis
is independent of masks or that it occupies an objective and neutral
(rather than perspectival) status.
At the same time, however, I believe Nietzsche is also driven by
the will to truth in his genealogical investigation and thus is impli
cated in a modified version of the ascetic ideal. What is at stake in
Nietzsche's writings is a kind of truth-seeking that uncovers and
exposes the blind, restrictive and un-self-critical nature of meta
physical discourse. It is not that Nietzsche believes that the Christian
corruption of asceticism conceals and distorts a more fundamental
truth about asceticism which will be offered up to us by means of the
genealogical critique. He does not suggest that there exist such
"correct" definitions. Instead, Nietzsche's ascetic truths consist in
problematizing the very notion of stable truths. On the other hand,
Nietzsche does make use of certain descriptive formulations and
theoretical models (such as the will to power and the eternal recur
rence) and, though he never systematizes these concepts, he does
rely on them to an extent that indicates his belief in their applicability
and validity. Thus, he is engaged to a certain extent in a continuation
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of the ascetic project in one of its unpredicted transformations.
What alters this ideal in Nietzsche's work is, first, the ubiquitous
movement of self-overcoming that constantly destabilizes the au
thority of his own position and, secondly. his re-thinking of the
object of philosophical inquiry. Nietzsche's own hypotheses are
inspired by the will to truth in that they provide an organizing
mechanism or serve an explanatory function; at the same time,
however, they are undercut by Nietzsche's claim that all such
mechanisms are interpretations shaped by one's perspective and
thus are exposed as regulatory fictions, models, frames. This strategy
of self-overcoming or self-revealing frees Nietzsche's inquiry from
thebadfaith of the Christian ascetic ideal which denies its hermeneu
tic falsifying and masking. Secondly, Nietzsche re-describes the
notion of truth and thereby redirects philosophical inquiry. For
Nietzsche, what renders the will to truth so destructive and life
negating is its insistence on attaining unconditional truths which can
be grasped with certainty in an ahistoricized and universalized
manner. To speak of right or wrong, truth or falsehood per se in
isolation from a particular context is meaningless. For Nietzsche, the
concept of truth is continually destabilized by the reinsertion of
terms into the specific context in which they arise and by the refusal
of abstract truths. He states, "only that which has no history can be
defined" (GM, p. 212); thus, since all truth-claims and values evolve
in a temporal medium and are influenced by the historical situation
in which they appear, no term, it seems, is definable in any ultimate
sense. On the other hand, this realization need not abort the truth
seeking project because this project, reconsidered in the Nietzschean
manner, does not aim at stable, abiding categories of meaning. The
truth-object is, for Nietzsche, always in flux, always subject to
continual reappropriation by various viewpoints, yet this lack of
fixity does not detract from the affirmative philosopher's project; on
the contrary, this instability enriches the meaningfulness ofhis or her
interpretations by allowing for the existence and value of other
interpretations. Therefore, unlike advocates of the Christian ascetic
ideal who perceive the revelation of the unstable nature of truth
claims to constitute an impediment to all further inquiry, the affirma
tive thinker has enough resilience to absorb this revelation into his or
her search for conditional truths. This realization does not exempt us
from philosophizing but instead invites us into a process which is
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infinitely more challenging, dangerous, life-affinning and fruitful.
In conclusion, I believe that one can speak of the possibility of an
asceticism which springs from an overabundant affirmation of life
and which avoids slipping into the extremes of either an uncritical
reverence for truth or an abandonment of the whole truth-seeking
project. First of all, in the sensual realm, if one's self-restraint is not
promptedby a self-righteous desire to evoke guilt inothers, involves
the deepening and sub limating of the passions and combines a spirit
of levity with a refusal to capitulate to a single established norm, the
ascetic can embrace life as a whole while transfigurmg certain
aspects of it. Secondly, if we can avoid baptizing our beliefs as
"truths" with deadly solemnity and endure the destabilizing move
ment of questioning in the absence of solutions, this seems to me to
involve a Nietzschean reformulation of asceticism, an aspiration
towards the Nietzschean ideal of an "artistic Socrates" in conjoining
the awareness of the indeterminacy of the theoretical ground on
which we stand with a willingness to commit ourselves passionately
to our beliefs. This self-reflexive form of asceticism contains the
strength both to confirm that some ideological constructs are mean
ingfulmsofar as they address humanneeds and to recognize the role
that convention plays in their construction. The abstractions oflogic
or the rules of grammar, for instance, may facilitate communication
and co-existence with other human bemgs, but in certain contexts
they are certainly notbinding. In the end, Nietzsche does not want us
to abandon either sensual or intellectual asceticism. The brilliance of
his reformulated asceticism lies in the fact that it does not compel us
to eliminate all masks but to realize that we cannot exist without
them and that a mask which sits before our eyes long enough for us
to forget it is there must be problematized and historicized until the
nature ofitsfluidity, contingency, and open-endedness flows through
the fissures.
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